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Heise: Pluralism in Economics: Inquiries into a Daedalean Concept 
 
Summary 
 
The state of contemporary economics had been a subject of discussion even before the 
most recent global financial crisis. The one-sidedness of the discipline has frequently 
been lamented and calls are often made for its pluralisation. Nevertheless, there is 
neither a consensus over the form of pluralism that is required (whether this is a theory, 
method, or paradigm pluralism, for example), nor agreement among economists over 
the underlying diagnosis of a lack of pluralism. Even the justification for this pluralistic 
norm—i.e. whether it should be seen in terms of an ethics of fairness and tolerance or as 
the imperative of academic freedom—remains disputed and is often unclear. The 
present paper aims to shed some light on these ambiguities. 
 
Keywords: pluralism, philosophy of science, heterodoxy, orthodoxy, mainstream 
 
JEL classification: B 40, B 41, B 50 
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1. Introduction: The Return of the ‘Pluralism Debate’* 
 
The recent global financial crisis dealt a heavy blow to economics.1 The latter has come 
under fire from political circles, which have reproached it both with its inability to see 
the crisis coming and its incapacity even to give a plausible retrospective explanation of 
it and to develop acceptable counter-measures against future crises (cf. 
Besley/Hennessey 2009; Merkel 2014). What is in question here is the practical 
serviceability of economics as the source of its legitimacy. Those involved in 
economic affairs at the practical level have noted that certain theoretical notions (such 
as the theory of efficient financial markets and the system of rating financial assets 
based upon it) were partly responsible for the crisis, since they assumed a capacity for 
risk assessment, and attributed to the financial markets a forecasting ability, that proved 
to be erroneous and fatal (cf. Cassidy 2009; Heise 2009a; Storbeck 2009). What is in 
question here is the responsibility of economics. Furthermore, students of the subject 
have complained about the oppressive dominance of a single scientific paradigm and the 
lack of historical perspective they are provided with (cf. ISIPE 2014). Critical, 
heterodox academics, meanwhile, have voiced their dissatisfaction with the increasing 
marginalisation of non-mainstream approaches and the associated effects on their 
publication prospects, access to (public) funding, and thus career prospects.2 Here it is a 
question of academic independence and integrity and a constitutionally protected 
right to academic freedom.3 
 
These criticisms of the current state of economics can be summarised in terms of a 
common demand: critics have lamented the lack of pluralism in the economic sciences 
and have therefore called for the pluralisation of the discipline: 
 
We are dissatisfied with the dramatic narrowing of the curriculum that has taken 
place over the last couple of decades. This lack of intellectual diversity does not 
only restrain education and research. It limits our ability to contend with the 
multidimensional challenges of the 21st century - from financial stability, to food 
security and climate change. The real world should be brought back into the 
classroom, as well as debate and a pluralism of theories and methods. Such 
                                                 
*
 This study has been commissioned by the Hans Böckler Foundation and will be published in 
German as IMK Study No. 46. 
1
 This article originally began: ‘The recent global financial crisis caused great consternation 
within economics.’ A commentator on the paper, however, pointed out that this was not at all 
the case; at best, the global financial crisis led to a short pause for thought (cf. e.g. 
Blanchflower 2009, Caballero 2010, Kirman 2010, Pesaran & Smith 2011), but not to a wide-
ranging discussion on the state of the discipline and its need for reform. Morgan (2015) shows 
that this was the case in universities in the UK; in Germany the situation was doubtless not 
greatly dissimilar; cf. Burda (2013).   
2
 1993 saw the founding of the ‘International Confederation of Associations for Pluralism in 
Economics’ (ICAPE), which brings together numerous national and international societies and 
associations, “all of which are united by their concern about the theoretical and practical 
limitations of neoclassical economics. In addition, they share the conviction that the current 
dominance of the subject by mainstream economics threatens academic freedom and is 
contrary to the norm of methodological pluralism.” (ICAPE). 
3
 Academic freedom not only includes protection from restrictive state intervention in the 
practice of a discipline (a ‘subjective right to defence’), but also the principle according to 
which the state is required to ensure free academic enquiry in its universities. This 
responsibility can in principle be entrusted to the academic community itself, but only when 
the latter does not erect its own barriers to access (cf. Garnett 2011).   
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change will help renew the discipline and ultimately create a space in which 
solutions to society’s problems can be generated. (ISIPE 2014)  
 
This is how the call for pluralisation was formulated in a statement published in 2014 by 
over 70 students’ organisations from over 30 countries.4  
 
This statement bears a strong resemblance to an appeal made by a group of economists 
(including a number of Nobel Prize winners) in the American Economic Review in 
1992: 
 
We the undersigned are concerned with the threat to economic science posed by 
intellectual monopoly. Economists today enforce a monopoly of method or core 
assumptions, often defended on no better ground than it constitutes the 
‘mainstream.’ Economists will advocate free competition, but will not practice it 
in the marketplace of ideas. Consequently, we call for a new spirit of pluralism in 
economics, involving critical conversation and tolerant communication between 
different approaches. Such pluralism should not undermine the standards of 
rigor; an economics that requires itself to face all the arguments will be a more, 
not a less, rigorous science.  
 
The ultimate aim of such a pluralisation is also clearly formulated in this appeal: 
 
We believe that the new pluralism should be reflected in the character of scientific 
debate, in the range of contributions in its journals, and in the training and hiring 
of economists (Abramovitz 1992) 
  
Here it is then a question of ensuring non-discriminatory access to economic, social, and 
symbolic capital in Pierre Bourdieu’s sense, since the latter plays a central role in 
shaping the competitive conditions of the academic field (cf. Bourdieu 1992).  
 
If we look a little further back in time, it is also evident that the demand for greater 
pluralism was a crucial element of attempts to reform the universities in the student 
movements of the 1960s—a period when the battle cry ‘pluralisation!’ triggered a 
debate on the dominant understanding of academic enquiry: 
 
It is difficult for conflicts between methods as methods to arise—on different 
paths, one does not get in one another’s way. The demand for scientific pluralism, 
understood as a demand for method pluralism, can only constitute a rather non-
committal recommendation to take into consideration all possible methods, or at 
least as many methods as possible; […]. The keenness and combativeness of the 
conflicts we are currently witnessing, however, is due to the fact that such a 
consensus is lacking; they are not disputes within scientific enquiry, but about it. 
The expression ‘scientific pluralism’ has recently come into use to characterise 
this situation. It refers not to an obvious and unproblematic variety of methods (or 
theories or disciplines) within a science, but rather to the problem that the 
character, status, concept, and limits of scientific enquiry are themselves disputed, 
that different conceptions of scientific enquiry, along with their various claims to 
truth and relevance, are in conflict, and, furthermore, that there is nothing that 
stands outside of this conflict—neither methods, theories, nor a disciplinary 
canon, nor even criteria that could be used to evaluate them (von Brentano 1971: 
476-7.).  
 
This glance back in time not only shows that we are now witnessing a re-vitalisation of 
this debate; it also allows us to see, in the light of the deconstructive endeavours of the 
1960s and 70s, the deeper ground and the severity of the rejection of the demand for 
                                                 
4
 There have been many other public appeals for greater pluralism, including: Auroi et al. 
(2011), Chesney et al. (2011), Sent (2006), and Thielemann et al. (2012). 
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pluralism (which was often pithily expressed in the slogan ‘Marx an die Uni’ (‘Marx to 
the university!’); cf. e.g. Herkommer 2013: 271ff.; Peter 2014).  
 
That the (German) social sciences in general and economics in particular have now been 
faced with such calls for pluralism for more than four decades without any apparent 
result5 may have a number of causes: 
 
• On the one hand, the ambiguity over what exactly is meant by pluralism (e.g. 
disciplinary, theory, method, or paradigm pluralism, to name just a few possible 
variations; cf. Dutt 2014: 480), may be so great that an attempt to implement the 
demand in the form of a pluralisation strategy would necessarily run aground 
due to the lack of a common basis and clearly defined goals (cf. Dutt 2014; Sent 
2006: 179ff.). 
• On the other hand, pluralism may also meet with significant internal resistance 
when, from an epistemological perspective, it is equated with relativism, 
obscurantism,6 or scientific immaturity.7  
• Or, finally, the diagnosis of a lack of pluralism might simply be contested. As 
the academic responsible for early career researchers at the German Economic 
Association (Verein für Socialpolitik – VfS), Rüdiger Bachmann, states: “In my 
view, the discipline is indeed very pluralistic. I think it is a shame when some 
suggest [Bachmann is referring to the students involved in the ‘Plurale 
Ökonomen’ (‘Plural Economists’) network] that they are the only critical voices 
[…] since the methods and theories within the mainstream are very diverse. The 
fields of research include economy and law, family economics, development 
economics; and then the classics: labour markets, public finance. The methods 
used include numerical models, traditional statistical methods, and more recently 
field experiments—I myself like to use surveys to study people’s expectations. 
So there is a great variety” (Bachmann 2015a: 87). In addition, the well-known 
methodologist David Colander has spoken of the ‘death of neoclassicism’ as the 
monistic mainstream paradigm (Colander 2000), since the mainstream has long 
been epistemologically pluralised (Colander/Holt/Rosser 2004). 
 
In the following, we shall then first be concerned to examine the concept of pluralism 
more carefully.8 We shall also aim to relate the various aspects of scientific pluralism to 
one another in order to illuminate the apparent paradox of how one can affirm the 
existence of scientific pluralism and reject it as a norm, and yet still regard the status 
                                                 
5
 A recent study showed that an earlier, quantitatively very limited process of pluralisation 
within a small number of German universities has long since been reversed through the 
marginalisation of heterodox economists; cf. Heise/Thieme (2015a); Heise/Thieme (2015b).    
6
 As Jean Tirole, the 2014 winner of the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in 
Memory of Alfred Nobel (generally referred to as the ‘Nobel Prize’ in order to share in the 
reputation of the ‘real’ Nobel Prize), put it in an open letter to the French Education Minister: 
Tirole (2014). 
7
 Thomas Kuhn’s influential theory of scientific progress (1972) can be interpreted as stating 
that, as a science develops, a certain paradigm comes to impose itself as the ‘normal science.’ 
The pluralistic coexistence of a number of paradigms would thus imply a low level of 
development.   
8
 In 2006, Robert Garnett complained that “Pluralism remains an undertheorized topic in 
economics” (Garnett 2006: 527). Though the literature on the topic has grown since then (see 
the post-2006 literature referenced below), Garnett’s analysis is still valid today. 
  
4 
quo in economics as acceptable—this seems to me the position adopted by Bachmann 
(2011: 263ff; 2015b), which is highly representative of the mainstream. Furthermore, a 
clearer conception of what pluralism amounts to is also needed to expose those who 
would illegitimately seek to jump on board the pluralism wagon.9 These tasks, however, 
can only be carried out on the basis of a theoretical discussion of the epistemological 
capacities of economics in its search for ‘absolute truth.’ Finally, the paper closes with a 
proposal for conceptualising pluralism and a number of reflections on the politics of 
scientific enquiry. 
 
 
2. Preliminary Theoretical Considerations: Truths, Errors, and their 
Difference 
 
Though economics is generally seen as a strongly methodical and methodological social 
science, methodological reflection and training is not accorded an especially prominent 
place within the discipline.10 This may be because, in the wake of two explicit 
‘Methodenstreits’ (‘method disputes),’ a consensus has been established that positivism 
provides us with a solid methodology that does not need to be questioned further. This 
is a rather recent view, however, and it is surely not possible to say that this broad 
consensus is the result of an intensive and profound theoretical discussion;11 it has 
rather arisen under the influence of attempts to professionalise and legitimise a maturing 
discipline,12 in response to the increasing scientific hegemony of the USA,13 and 
particularly the standardising power of a few elite US universities.14 
 
                                                 
9
 The Witten Institute for Institutional Change (WIWA), for example, awards a prize to young 
scholars for pluralism in economics. The institute’s description of pluralism runs as follows: 
“Pluralism in economics in the meaning of the invitation exclusively refers to the diversity of 
theoretical approaches and normative positions; nominations are generally not tied to any 
particular schools of thought. The only criteria are originality and creativity of published 
papers” (WIWA). Yet here the notion of ‘pluralism in economics’ loses any distinctive 
character and is equated with a simple variety that can be found in any discipline regardless of 
the range of its objects.  
10
 In many of the best-known economics textbooks there is either no systematic account of the 
discipline and its methodology (cf. e.g. Bofinger 2015, Mankiw/Taylor/Ashwin 2015, 
Samuelson 2010, Samuelson/Nordhaus 2010, Stiglitz/Walsh 2013, Blanchard/Illing 2014) or 
at best only an uncritical, unreflective introduction to positivism (cf. Burda/Wyplosz 2013, 
Mankiw 2015, Mankiw/Taylor 2014, Woll 2011); cf. also Lawson 1994.  
11
 Some have even spoken of a genuine aversion to methodological discussion, at least in post-
war German economics; cf. Hesse (2010: 256). Caldwell (1985: 233) also notes that “(s)ome 
economists openly disparage methodological work, because they consider it a waste of time.”   
12
 On this point, cf. Fourcade (2009: 125ff.) and Morgan/Rutherford (1998). 
13
 Though the ‘method disputes’ that have gone down in the history of economics have taken 
place within German-language scholarship, similar debates have occurred elsewhere (cf. e.g. 
Moore 2003). The particular influence that the USA has exerted on the development of 
economics in Germany is sometimes referred to as a process of ‘(self-)Americanisation (cf. 
Hesse 2010: 320ff.; Coats 1996). 
14
 On the methodological standardisation of economics cf. Heise/Thieme (2015). On the 
standardising power of the elite US universities cf. Graham/Diamond (1997), Lebaron (2006: 
92ff.), and Fourcade/Ollion/Algan (2015). Friedman’s influential article, ‘The Methodology 
of Positive Economics’ (Friedman 1953), played a leading role in this process of 
methodological standardisation.  
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Changing Conceptions of Economics  
 
Well into the 20th century—and thus long after the historic ‘Methodenstreits’ of the end 
of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century—economics 
(‘Volkswirtschaftslehre’ or ‘Nationalökonomie’) in Germany was oriented by the idea 
that scientific enquiry is concerned with the historically and geopolitically rooted 
‘interpretation’ of specific societal developments, and the exertion of political influence 
on the basis of value judgements. The so-called ‘historical school’ combined these 
elements and joined forces with the German Economic Association (Verein für 
Socialpolitik - VfS) to form an organisation that aimed to effect social and political 
change. In the universities, economics (Nationalökonomie) was part of the 
multidisciplinary Staatswissenschaften, which also included normatively loaded legal 
and political sciences. The ‘historical school’ was certainly not devoid of theory, but it 
did not aim to arrive at objective, universally valid certainties;15 it rather sought to 
influence social processes on the basis of inductively acquired—i.e. empirical—
experience and data. 
 
The above methodological disputes did not primarily revolve around whether scientific 
enquiry should be based upon deduction—i.e. drawing general conclusions from 
individual or representative derivations by means of certain hypotheses (‘theory’)—or 
upon induction—drawing conclusions about a given case on the basis of many 
empirical observations. They were rather concerned with the appropriate scientific 
conception of a discipline that was just beginning to break away from the 
Staatswissenschaften and thereby seeking to draw a clear distinction between sociology 
and political science as ‘interpretive’ disciplines and economics as an ‘explanatory’ 
discipline modelled on the natural sciences. Rather than being oriented around 
normative intervention (‘advocacy’), economics was to strive for objective knowledge 
of actual economic processes (‘objectivity’) or, as John Neville Keynes (1891: 34) put 
it, for “a body of systematized knowledge concerning what is.” In his famous article, 
‘The Methodology of Positive Economics,’ Milton Friedman added: “Positive 
economics is in principle independent of any particular ethical position or normative 
judgement. […] Its task is to provide a system of generalizations that can be used to 
make correct predictions about the consequences of any change in circumstances” 
(Friedman 1953: 4). This kind of positivism is not value-free, since it always rests on 
certain hypotheses16 and perspectives (including the research questions chosen), which 
                                                 
15
 The main champion of the ‘historical school’ in the disputes, Gustav Schmoller, saw for 
himself how his grandfather’s biological research on the continuity of species refuted the 
natural-scientific conception of an unchanging, pregiven nature (cf. Backhaus/Hansen 2000: 
315). Yet although nature was shown not to have an unchanging form with objectively 
recognisable properties and law-like regularities, for Schmoller this conclusion was even less 
transferable to social, economic, and societal relations.  
16
 With regard to Imre Lakatos’ notion of a research programme, which consists of an 
indispensable set of assumptions (a ‘hard core’) on the one hand, and a ‘protective belt’ of 
changeable hypotheses on the other, Blaug (1980: 34) states: “The hard core, as we have said, 
consists of empirically irrefutable beliefs and hence amounts to what others have called 
‘metaphysics.’ In other words, there is no positivist obsession in Lakatos to get rid of 
metaphysics once and for all. […] it is simply that the metaphysics of science is deliberately 
kept out of sight in the hard core, much like the playing cards in a game of poker are kept out 
of sight in the hands of the dealer, while the real game of science takes place in terms of the 
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can be selected and shaped by the researchers themselves and which are not simply 
given with the object of investigation. Nevertheless, the propositions and conclusions 
yielded via deductive methods must be intersubjectively verifiable and in this sense free 
of value judgements.17 
  
The Distinction between Knowledge and Non-Knowledge 
 
This transformed conception of economics made it necessary to draw a sharp distinction 
between ‘objective knowledge’ (‘truth’) as the intended and purported result of 
scientific activity, and the ‘opinions,’ ‘prejudices,’ or even ‘errors’ that result from non-
scientific activity. In other words: it demanded basic agreement over which methods 
produce knowledge that can be considered as ‘truth’ or as scientifically established 
knowledge (and which methods can be rejected as producing ‘errors’ or at least 
dismissed as being scientifically untenable). The notion that this distinction between 
truth and error can always and unambiguously be drawn goes back to Francis Bacon 
(1561 – 1626): “If truth is manifest, truth is there to be seen” (Boland 1997: 98). With 
Immanuel Kant (1724 – 1804) and David Hume (1711 – 1776), however, it became 
clear that empirical experience (induction) and logical derivation (deduction) cannot 
simply be distinct from one another, since the ‘induction problem’ (i.e. the possibility 
that the nth confirmation of an empirical phenomenon might be falsified on its 
repetition)18 shows that empirical experience (however well-developed our empirical 
methods may be) is not sufficient to establish objective knowledge. And ‘pure reason’ 
alone, i.e. the deduction of ‘synthetic a priori knowledge,’19 as Kant put it, remains an 
empty category that cannot produce any certainty; the latter is only achieved a 
posteriori (retrospectively, on the basis of empirical experience) by comparing our 
predictions with empirical experience. Friedman (1953: 4) thus observes that: “Its 
[positive economics’] performance is to be judged by the precision, scope, and 
conformity with experience of the predictions it yields. In short, positive economics is, 
                                                                                                                                               
cards in the hands of the players, that is, the falsifiable theories in the protective belt.” 
17
 The scientific notion of positivism was rejected by the ‘critical theorists’ in the so-called 
positivism dispute of the early 1960s. On the one hand, the anti-positivists wished to return to 
‘value-led understanding’; on the other, they rejected the contention that genuinely scientific 
knowledge can only be based on what is observable (and so what can be empirically tested); 
this would mean that much of the value-oriented theory underlying (Marxist) ‘critical theory’ 
would have to be considered unscientific—and the same would also be true of other 
paradigms. Since the ‘positivism dispute’ explicitly revolved around the scientific basis of 
sociology and had little impact in the sphere of economics, it will remain a footnote here to 
the broader story we are concerned with (an overview of the dispute is given in Beed 1991).      
18
 In order to explain the problem of induction, it is often pointed out that anyone who might be 
asked—however young or old they may be—has necessarily had the experience of waking up 
again every morning. If we were to use this experience to derive conclusions about the future 
and claim that human beings are immortal, however, this would be contradicted by the 
universal experience that all human beings eventually die (but since this conclusion is also the 
result of inductive reasoning, it too cannot be certain).  
19
 A priori = in advance. Kant distinguishes between analytic and synthetic judgements. 
Analytic judgements are contained within the object in question; they do not bring us any new 
knowledge (e.g. ‘the gray horse’ is white); synthetic judgements, by contrast, provide us with 
new knowledge, since they are not already contained within the object (e.g. ‘the horse eats 
grass’). This distinction between analytic and synthetic judgements would later take on crucial 
significance in epistemology.   
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or can be, an ‘objective’ science, in precisely the same sense as any of the physical 
sciences.”  
 
Open and Closed Systems 
 
Modern economics thus sets itself the task—and here it resembles the natural sciences 
and departs from the ‘interpretive’ social sciences—of acquiring knowledge that can be 
considered ‘objective,’ that is not based on value judgements, and that therefore 
constitutes ‘truth.’ In order for this to be possible, it must of course be assumed that 
such truth exists in the first place—i.e. that there is only one correct explanation of our 
social and economic phenomena, which is independent of the ideological, religious, or 
ethnic background of the observer. This in turn implies the singularity of reality as a 
cognitive and veristic category—or the ‘one world, one truth’ principle (cf. Mäki 
2002: 124ff.). However reasonable the idea might seem that all observers are confronted 
with one and the same reality and that there is therefore only one (correct) ‘explanatory’ 
truth of this reality, the ‘one world, one truth’ principle is contested by relativists and 
constructivists. Relativists object that even for ‘one world’ there may be many possible 
explanations, since these are always culturally and historically specific. Constructivists, 
on the other hand, maintain that reality itself (and not only the explanation we give of 
it)—at least in its social, if not its material, dimensions20—is always constructed by the 
observer.21  
 
In calling into question the self-conception of economics as a discipline, the relativist 
and constructivist rejection of ontological and veristic monism22 is itself in need of 
justification. As a meta-theoretical approach, relativism can be contested by turning its 
own claim (‘absolute knowledge is impossible’) back against it. The constructivist 
position, on the other hand, needs to be considered in a little more detail in relation to 
the philosophy of science. The systems that can be understood to constitute our social 
reality are comprised of elements (e.g. agents) and their relations or interconnections 
(actions) (cf. Loasby 2003). In closed systems,23 all of the elements are connected to 
one another and the development of the system is deterministic (or stochastic, if we 
admit contingent deviations). Depending on the number of elements and relations it 
contains, such a system may be extremely complicated (and on account of the cognitive 
limits of the observer, may never be grasped in its entirety), yet it cannot be complex.24 
                                                 
20
 On this conception, theories can be understood as kaleidoscopes, each of which gives a 
different picture of reality.  
21
 An important distinction between ‘different facets of a social reality’ (the existence of which 
is uncontroversial) and ‘different social realities’ (which is what the constructivists have in 
mind) is not always made here; cf. e.g. Samuels (1972: 306). 
22
 The constructivist view is roughly the following: “looked at differently, there are different 
definitions of problems, different methods for obtaining data, different methods for drawing 
conclusions from data, different methods for the collation and reconciliation of differing 
conclusions drawn from data; hence a diversity of ways of conceiving and solving problems, 
with competing and complementary resolutions and emphases, and with fundamental 
incompleteness a characteristic of each“ (Samuels 1972: 307).  
23
 On the difference between closed and open systems cf. also Dow (2004: 283). 
24
 Since this system can only take on one state, we would speak here of a complexity level of 
zero. More complex systems are able to take on a variety of states (cf. Cramer 1993: 275ff.). 
Complexity is often confused with complicatedness, not only in everyday language, but also 
in scientific communication: “In a broad, general sense, complex merely means complicated” 
(Dequech 2001: 913); cf. also Schianchi (1997: 125) or Rodrik (2015: 37ff.) .  
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In such a system, all of the elements can in principle be clearly described, or, in Kant’s 
terminology, they contain within themselves ‘analytic a priori judgements.’ In the 
literal sense, then, these systems are fully analysable. In open systems, by contrast, not 
all of the elements are connected to one another; such systems are thus non-
deterministic and not fully analysable. Depending on how many elements they contain 
and the number of missing links between them, such systems may be both very 
complicated and very complex.25 Open systems must then be conceived in terms of 
‘synthetic a priori judgements’, i.e. ontological propositions that do not rest on 
empirical experience and that are not already contained within the elements themselves. 
In order to reduce their complexity, open systems can also be converted into closed 
systems by invoking certain hypotheses—i.e. what is in reality an open system can be 
considered in theoretical abstraction as a closed system, in the hope that this will not 
lead one on to the wrong track.  
 
We are now in a position to gain a better understanding of the ontological claims made 
by the relativist and the constructivist. If our social and economic reality amounts to an 
open, non-fully analysable (i.e. complex) model, then there cannot be just one (true) 
theoretical representation of it; rather, all possible representations can and must enter 
into competition with one another: “Since our representations are always incomplete, 
innovation is always possible; we can change the set of elements, revise the internal 
linkages between them or redefine the external connections. […] since the discovery of 
better alternatives is necessarily a matter of trial and error, there are clear advantages in 
encouraging many people to use their imagination“ (Loasby 2003: 301). In other words: 
the ontological (and veristic) monism underlying the ‘one world, one truth’ principle 
can only be defended if the object of investigation is understood as a closed system.26 
And though it is seldom explicitly acknowledged,27 this is precisely the premise of the 
mainstream, neoclassical model of economics: “It is indeed the proclaimed virtue of 
general equilibrium reasoning that it takes into account all the possible interactions 
between all the elements that are included in the model; therefore, if uncertainty about 
future possibilities appears to prevent the completion of the set of connections between 
present decisions and their full set of consequences, then we must agree that the 
imaginative response of Arrow and Debreu in extending the set of elements to include 
all future dates and all possible states of the world – which are fully connected to every 
other element in the model – was methodologically appropriate” (Loasby 2003: 291). 
The systemic closure assumed by the neoclassical orthodoxy in the construction of the 
                                                 
25
 The greater the number of potential states a system can take on, the more complex it is. In 
order to reduce this complexity (scientific thought does nothing else), hypotheses can simply 
be made concerning the missing links between elements. In this way, systems that are in fact 
open can be considered as closed from a scientific perspective, and theoretical innovations can 
be brought about by changing the hypotheses concerning the missing links.   
26
 To put this as clearly as possible: it is not enough here that the relevant economic and social 
reality can be taken as a closed system; it must unequivocally be taken as such a system. As 
we saw above, we can treat any system—whether closed or open—as a closed system in order 
to reduce its complexity; in such cases, however, the representation of a closed system would 
only be one possible representation, not its one ‘true’ representation.  
27
 Neither in Blaug’s influential book on economic methodology (Blaug 1980) nor in the 
textbooks on macroeconomics noted above is there any reference to the difference between 
open and closed systems. 
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‘general equilibrium theory’ would thus appear to meet the methodological 
requirements of positivistic model construction.28  
 
Verificationsm, Fallibilism, and the Duhem-Quine Thesis 
 
‘Positive economics’ thus calls for a methodology capable of endowing propositions 
with a level of scientific knowledge that would generally be interpreted as ‘truth.’ As 
we have seen, in order to assume that there is such a singular truth at all, we need to 
impose certain ontological restrictions on our object of investigation. And neoclassical 
mainstream economics does indeed impose such restrictions: “The mechanistic 
worldview of classical economics implies that there is a basically fixed, discernible 
national economic structure that can be used to make predictions” (Roos 2015: 384; 
own translation). The ‘discernibility’ of such a structure implies the possibility of 
theoretical analysis here. On this approach, theoretical deduction delivers ‘analytic a 
priori judgements’ that are on the one hand consistently derivable and thus 
intersubjectively verifiable, and on the other have to be reconciled with the empirically 
experienceable reality. Such a methodology is often thought to bring together the human 
and natural sciences (cf. e.g. Popper 1957: 130). In light of the induction problem, 
however, empirical tests—contrary to the individual practice of the majority of 
scientists (cf. Blaug 1980): XIIIff.)—can neither verify nor confirm the predictions and 
the underlying model in question, but can at best serve to falsify them. According to one 
of the best-known proponents of neo-positivist fallibilism, Karl Popper, while the truth 
of things is singular (given the ontological restrictions discussed above), there can be no 
certain knowledge of this truth, but at best only ‘conjectural knowledge.’ Science is 
thus not in a position to reveal the truth but only to limit error. And any 
intersubjectively verifiable claim can be considered as conjectural knowledge29 until an 
empirical proof is given to the contrary.30 Science is therefore always ‘critical’ insofar 
as every scientist ought to critically examine—i.e. seek to falsify—his results through 
empirical testing. And even if the scientist himself, as a ‘knowledge producer,’ should 
be little inclined to subject his own results to an overly critical regard, the scientific 
community will test any proposed conjectural knowledge before temporarily accepting 
it—until it is refuted on the basis of new data or better measuring techniques.31  
 
Here we might again recall that this process of trial and error ultimately has the task of 
discriminating between competing explanatory approaches in the search for the ‘one’ 
                                                 
28
 As Dani Rodrik (2015: 10) notes in this regard: “Training in economics consists essentially of 
learning a sequence of models. […] Models are a source of pride. Hang around with 
economists and before long you will encounter the ubiquitous mug or T-shirt that says, 
‘Economists do it with models’.” This is precisely the problem that many social scientists who 
hold a different conception of science find with economics. Yet the economist, of course, sees 
things differently: “In truth, simple models of the type that economists construct are 
absolutely essential to understanding the workings of society” (Rodrik 2010: 11).      
29
 This applies in principle both to ‘analytic a priori judgements’ and ‘synthetic  a priori 
judgements.’  
30
 Here it is necessary to pass both an ex post explanatory test and an ex ante predictive test.  
31
 Indeed, the publication of many papers on related themes can be seen as an attempt to falsify 
the results of scientific enquiry. Sometimes the results of empirical studies are also reproduced 
by other scientists using the same data—and here they can only be falsified if methodological 
mistakes were made in the original study. Such apparently rare cases quickly develop into 
‘scandals’; cf. the recent ‘Reinhart-Rogoff’ case: Amann/Middleditch 2015; Cassidy 2013; 
Hendon/Ash/Pollin (2014).  
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truth of things. The criteria invoked may include the accuracy of fit, predictive 
capacities, simplicity (following ‘Ockham’s razor’), and robustness of these models and 
theories. According to the fallibilists, at the end of this process (which may involve a 
long period of competition between various theories), the best conjectural knowledge 
will prevail (cf. Spinner 1974: 74), thus minimising the likelihood of error through the 
greatest possible approximation to the ‘truth.’32 An interminable competition between a 
number of incompatible theories33 could then only be due to the refusal of part of the 
scientific community to acknowledge the superiority of another, better explanation of 
reality. This refusal, however, would have to be rejected as either ideologically 
motivated or irrational.  
 
And yet, there is a catch: this process of rationally choosing between different 
propositions of course only works if there is no disagreement or doubt about whether a 
theory has really been falsified or has to be replaced by another proposition with greater 
explanatory power. Yet this demands unequivocal measuring techniques and 
unambiguous ‘experimental designs.’ The propositions that are to be falsified must then 
be capable, along with all of their conditions, of being unambiguously described and 
tested. In non-experimental contexts, however, this is simply not possible, since theories 
always consist of interlinked axioms and hypotheses or, in Imre Lakatos’ terms, of a 
hard core of assumptions and a ‘protective belt of auxiliary hypotheses.’ The claim that 
only individual hypotheses (normally ceteris paribus propositions, which are supposed 
to provide stable boundary conditions in the construction of economic models) can be 
falsified, rather than entire theories, has been attributed to Pierre Duhem (1861 – 1916) 
and Willard Van Orman Quine (1908 – 2000). By changing certain background 
hypotheses in the protective belt, it is at least possible to escape an ex post falsification 
even if an ex ante predictive test has been failed. The hope that fallibilism might then 
provide a reliable method for rationally deciding between theories falls apart in the face 
of the Duhem-Quine thesis (cf. Cross 1982). As Blaug (1980: 26) states: 
  
We have now reached one of our central conclusions: just as there is no logic of 
discovery, so there is no demonstrative logic of justification either; there is no formal algorithm, no mechanical procedure of verification, falsification, 
confirmation, corroboration, or call it what you will. To the philosophical 
question ‘How can we acquire apodictic knowledge of the world when all we can 
rely on is our own unique experience?’ Popper replies that there is no certain 
empirical knowledge, whether grounded in our own personal experience or in that 
of mankind in general. And more than that: there is no sure method of 
guaranteeing that the fallible knowledge we do have of the real world is positively 
the best we can possess under the circumstances. A study of the philosophy of 
science can sharpen our appraisal of what constitutes acceptable empirical 
knowledge, but it remains a provisional appraisal nevertheless. We can invite the 
most severe criticism of this appraisal, but what we cannot do is to pretend that 
there is on deposit somewhere a perfectly objective method, that is, an 
intersubjectively demonstrative method, that will positively compel agreement on 
                                                 
32
 It is surely in this sense that Bachmann asserts: “Good ideas prevail in the end, especially 
today when the costs of reaching a global audience are at an all-time low” (Bachmann 2015b: 
650). In doing so, he misappropriates Yalcintas’ (2013) notion of ‘epistemic costs,’ namely 
the idea that the labour time expended on the elaboration and development of a theory or 
large-scale interpretation of reality (a paradigm) leads to path dependence. This makes it less 
likely that such theories or paradigms will be rejected even when they are falsified, and thus 
serves to cast doubt on the notion of the purifying power of the scientific ideas market. 
33
 The coexistence of competing theories or paradigms is seen here as an indication of the 
‘immaturity’ of a scientific discipline, either in the sense that the falsification process has not 
yet come to an end, or in the Kuhnian sense that a ‘scientific revolution’ is underway.  
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what are or are not acceptable scientific theories (Blaug 1980: 26; emphasis in 
original).  
 
Economics thus cannot consistently meet the high scientific standards it sets itself, but 
this does not mean that we are then reduced to a form of ‘anything goes’ nihilism (cf. 
Tiedemann 1993: 121ff. and the further discussion below). For it would clearly be a 
mistake to conclude that, since purely rational discrimination between competing 
theories is impossible, any hypothesis, however it might have been arrived at, can be 
regarded as ‘conjectural knowledge.’34 Positivistic fallibilism—whether in the form of 
critical rationalism, critical realism, or dialectical materialism (cf. Portsmann 2002)—
sets standards for the logical rigour of the deduction of model-based predictions and 
their empirical falsifiability (cf. Davis 2012: 13) that pure empiricism, historicism, and 
phenomenalism (as alternative methodologies) cannot and indeed do not wish to meet 
(since they subscribe to a very different conception of science).35      
  
3. Scientific Pluralism: Conceptual Clarification and Application to 
Economics 
 
Before we can consider the consequences of the preceding theoretical reflections for our 
conception of science and scientific practice within economics, we first need to clarify 
the concept of pluralism and its theoretical foundations. To this end we shall first 
consider the following statement:  
 
Since no theory can take into account all factors there is scope for pluralism in 
economic theory. Theories may be discriminated according to which factors they 
take into consideration in explaining a certain phenomenon. However, even if two 
theories were to take into account the same set of factors there would still be 
scope for pluralism: the importance attributed to each of these factors and their 
interaction may be conceptualized differently. […] In both cases discussed it 
could be argued that the alternative theories are not really alternative but 
complementary, that is, each of them contributes to a better understanding of the 
phenomenon under discussion. To seek dominance for one theory over the others 
with the possible result that all rival theories are extinguished amounts to 
advocating scientific regress. To paraphrase Voltaire: In a subject as difficult as 
economics a state of doubt may not be very comfortable, but a state of certainty 
would be ridiculous (Kurz/Salvatori 1997: 234). 
 
This citation was chosen because it serves to illustrate a range of problems that crop up 
in the pluralism debate (cf. also Lawson 2010: 102): Firstly, it is unclear what kind of 
pluralism is in question here. In the literature, various kinds of pluralism are discussed, 
including ontological, epistemological, paradigmatic, methodological, theoretical, and 
other forms of pluralism, all of which might be intended here.36 Secondly, it is not clear 
                                                 
34
 Langmuir (1989) speaks here of ‘pathological science,’ which can be clearly distinguished 
from acceptable conjectural knowledge.  
35
 Samuels (1993: 244) describes this as ‘sensible nihilism’: “One does not have to assume 
either perfect knowledge or complete ignorance of the future. One can work in various points 
in the middle range. But one does have to maintain, consciously and explicitly, a sense of 
limits.” One could equally well understand this position as ‘sensible anti-nihilism.’ On the 
basis of a discussion of the Keynes-Hayek debate on business cycle theory, Scheall (2015) 
presents the thesis of the impossibility of rational paradigm choice and shows that although 
this must lead to pluralism, it need not lead to nihilism.  
 
36
 King (2002a) interprets Kurz and Salvatori’s account of pluralism as a plea for a multiplicity 
of complementary theories in response to a multi-faceted reality. This is a notion of pluralism 
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what underlies this call for pluralism: is it the complicatedness or complexity of the 
object of investigation, or is it the particular epistemological challenges of the discipline 
(‘a subject as difficult as economics’) that makes a plurality of theories, methods, or 
paradigms necessary? Furthermore, the conclusion that the reduction of the various 
theoretical alternatives to one dominant theory (or is rather ‘paradigm’ intended here?) 
would amount to a scientific regress can neither be reconciled with the notion of the 
pursuit of (unambiguous) truth nor with the standardising demands and the specific 
qualities of the ‘market for economic knowledge.’37 And it is in such terms that 
Mariyani-Squire/Mossa (2015: 200) offer “…a thumbnail sketch of what a genuine 
science of economics would amount to: it would ideally be a discipline that sought a 
complete, objective account of the ‘laws of motion’ which would causally explain the 
‘characteristics’ and ‘function(ing)’ of the investigator-independent economic ‘system’ 
in its parts and as a whole. Although this conception of an economic science does not 
deny ontological complexity and diversity and does not deny human fallibility, it does 
lend itself to an ultimately monistic paradigmatic vision of the future of the economics 
discipline.” Sheila Dow (2004: 282) describes the monistic impetus of the economic 
sciences in a very similar, though qualified manner: “Were it defensible, a monist 
approach would be more satisfactory.” Pluralism thus cannot be derived in the form of 
an ethical norm (e.g. of tolerance) that might be accepted or rejected depending on one’s 
standpoint, but must rather be presented as the only acceptable model of enquiry in light 
of the rejection of the possibility of monism (‘were it defensible’).38 Yet this first of all 
requires a clearer delineation of the concept of pluralism.  
 
Plurality, Pluralisation, Pluralism 
 
While the term ‘plurality’ simply describes a certain state, independently of its 
desirability as a norm, ‘pluralisation’ refers to the process of transition from a state of 
singularity to one of plurality. Both terms are derived from the Latin pluralis, which 
means ‘multitude’ or ‘belonging to more than one.’ ‘Pluralism,’ by contrast, is a 
philosophical doctrine based on a norm that goes beyond the simple defence of a 
multitude of possibilities. ‘Pluralism’ thus does not simply refer, in a quantitative 
manner, to a multitude of elements; these elements must also contain within themselves 
the qualitative possibility of being opposed (i.e. incompatible) or being incomparable 
(incommensurable) with one another. In this sense, then, ‘pluralisation’ does not simply 
describe the process of transition from a state of singularity to a state of simple 
                                                                                                                                               
that is unlikely to be rejected by any serious scientist.    
37
 The specific qualities of this ‘market for economic knowledge’ are elaborated in 
Heise/Thieme (2015). The market revolves around the provision of ‘public goods’ in the form 
of credence goods whose value is not determined by market prices but by recognition from the 
scientific community. Furthermore, since this is a ‘shrinking market’ (there tends to be a 
surplus of economic knowledge producers) with high sunk costs, a demand arises for 
‘production standards’ (in order to reduce the uncertainty of human capital development) and 
a range of implicit forms of standardisation through path dependence and lock-in effects (cf. 
also Yalcintas 2016). 
38
 “The monistic maintenance of the disciplinary status quo through the exclusion of any 
alternative theories—and thus of practically any genuinely effective opposition (since contrary 
facts are not by themselves sufficient to falsify sophisticated, well-established, and potentially 
tried and tested theories)—robs experience of its critical function, which remains latent or in a 
weak state as long as it does not receive theoretical stimulation” (Spinner 1974: 76; emphasis 
in original). 
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multiplicity, but rather to a state of plurality, which involves incompatibilities and 
incommensurabilities. Where these properties are lacking, we would speak rather of 
‘variation’ or ‘differentiation,’ and the resultant state would not be a plurality, but a 
‘variety’ or a ‘multitude.’  
 
Forms of Scientific Pluralism 
 
In the literature (cf. e.g. Dow 1997; Mäki 1997; Mariyani-Squire/Moussa 2015) a 
number of forms pluralism are discussed, including: 
 
• Ontological pluralism 
• Methodological pluralism 
• Epistemological pluralism 
• Method pluralism 
• Theoretical pluralism 
• Paradigmatic pluralism 
 
What is first of all necessary is to enquire into the essence of the object of economic 
enquiry—its ontology. If we can be absolutely certain that our social reality is singular 
(i.e. that there are no material or socially constructed parallel worlds) and that it can 
thus be regarded as a closed system and in principle fully analysable, then an 
ontological monism would be justified and ontological pluralism (as a description of a 
state of affairs, not as a scientific norm) would at best have to be seen as an indication 
of the immaturity of the discipline. If we do not have such certainty, then an ontological 
scepticism or relativism (where we are confronted with a number of parallel worlds) or 
an ontological pluralism (where we are confronted with open systems) is the necessary 
consequence.39 Scepticism and relativism deny the existence of ‘absolute truths’; 
pluralism, on the other hand, does not deny their existence, but rather the scientist’s 
capacity to establish these beyond any doubt.40 The ontological pluralist thus does not 
have to reject the claim that our social reality is a closed system at the epistemological 
level (an assumption that can simply serve to reduce complexity); but he cannot grant it 
the status of an axiom. 
 
At this epistemological level, which is concerned with the axiomatic dimensions of a 
research programme (in Lakatos’ terminology, or a ‘paradigm’ in that of Kuhn), a 
monistic position equally requires the analytic a priori certainty of a closed system in 
which the relations between the various elements can be unambiguously specified. If, 
however, it is not possible to unequivocally and impartially determine all of the 
relations between the elements of the social system, the resultant a priori synthesis of 
the object of investigation will call for an epistemological pluralism. An axiomatic 
explanation of social reality as a system of symmetrical exchange relations, for 
example, cannot then have an a priori privilege over other kinds of explanation, such as 
                                                 
39
 That relativism and scepticism are not to be equated with pluralism is shown for example by 
Terkivatan (2006: 29ff.).  
40
 De Langhe (2010a) claims to have discovered a ‘pluralism paradox.’ In his view, this lies in 
the fact that, in the face of a number of equally well-justified, competing explanations of 
reality, the pluralist must either give up the claim to truth underlying the choice of one of 
these explanations—and thus the basis of science in general—or must give up the claim that 
all of these explanations are equally well-justified—and thus the foundation of pluralism. 
This, however, is only a problem for the relativist/sceptic, but not for the pluralist, who 
certainly makes a claim to truth, but due to the methodological limits of the discipline does 
not assert it against other paradigms in a discriminating manner. 
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those which place hierarchical creditor-debtor relations or relations of 
subordination in the foreground. Even an approach that takes individual rationality as 
the basis of relations within a social system in which mechanico-hydraulic dynamic 
regularities are postulated does not have any a priori privilege over a biologistic 
explanation (such as swarm/collective intelligence or rationality; cf. e.g. 
Bonabeau/Dorigo/Theraulaz 1999), which supposes the existence of organic relations 
between complex, self-regulating systems (cf. e.g. Hodgson 1997: 142ff.; Beinhocker 
2013).41 
 
While epistemological pluralism logically follows from ontological pluralism (cf. Dow 
1997: 91), ontological monism in no way justifies epistemological monism. In other 
words: if one defines scientific pluralism in ontological terms, one can defend a form of 
monism (and thus reject pluralism) even if one grants an epistemological plurality. If 
one advocates pluralism beyond the epistemological level, however, one must ipso facto 
advocate ontological pluralism and potentially even a form of scepticism/relativism 
(and thus reject ontological monism). 
 
Table 1: Forms of Scientific Pluralism 
Form of Pluralism Characteristics Expression Monism 
presuppositions 
Ontological pl. Rejection of the ‘one 
world, one truth’ 
principle. 
• Acceptance of 
parallel worlds 
• Acceptance of reality 
as an ‘open system’ 
• Existence of only 
one social reality. 
• This social reality 
constitutes a ‘closed 
system’ 
Methodological pl. Rejection of a universal 
test of scientific validity 
‘Anything goes’ Existence of only one 
social reality  
Epistemological 
pl. 
Rejection of a universal 
axiomatic 
Various axiomatic 
systems are admitted in 
the form of an ‘a priori 
synthesis.’ 
Social reality fulfils the 
criteria for ‘a priori 
analysis’ 
Method pl. Rejection of a universal 
method  
In addition to formal 
deduction and advanced 
econometrics, other 
methods (including 
abduction, social 
experiments, narration) 
are also acknowledged 
        
 
 
- (Not justifiable) 
Theoretical pl. Rejection of an all-
encompassing theory 
Various complementary 
theories in different 
fields of enquiry 
Simplicity of social 
reality, whose simple 
regularities can be 
captured through an all-
encompassing approach 
Paradigmatic pl. Rejection of a universal 
research programme 
(‘paradigm’) 
Coexistence of various 
paradigms, which differ 
in terms of their 
axiomatics, methods, and 
heuristics 
As a closed system, 
social reality must be 
fully analysable  
                                                 
41
 It is of course constitutive of pluralism that this point can be inverted. When Coricelli/Dosi 
(1988: 126; my emphasis) claim, for example, that “the project of building dynamic models 
with economic content and descriptive power by relying solely on the basic principles of 
rationality and perfect competition through the market process has generally failed,” then this 
statement must be rejected at least until a universally accepted proof of this falsification has 
been given. The fact that the approach described by Coricelli/Dosi is still followed by the 
majority of professional economists does not necessarily indicate the success of the 
falsification.   
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The methodological and epistemological levels are sometimes seen as corresponding to 
one another (e.g. Samuels 1997). Yet what is at issue at the methodological level, 
which is not to be confused with the method level (cf. Sent (2006: 179) or Dutt (2014: 
482), who does precisely this), is the process of distinguishing between truth and error. 
On a naturalistic conception of economics, methods such as historicism and 
phenomenalism are incapable of establishing ‘objective’ knowledge. The alternative 
constituted by positivistic fallibilism acknowledges that the relevant ontological 
restrictions do not allow ‘truths’ to be affirmatively demonstrated, but do allow errors to 
be excluded. Nevertheless, as we saw above, the limitations of test procedures in non-
experimental surroundings (the Duhem-Quine thesis) mean that the ‘conjectural 
knowledge’ arrived at in this way cannot necessarily be reduced to a single piece of 
conjectural knowledge. The dubiousness of such scientific knowledge, however, only 
justifies a departure from monism if the singularity of social reality is rejected at the 
ontological level. In such a case, when even the existence of ‘objective truth’ is 
challenged and thus no procedure for distinguishing between different claims is 
required, there is also no justification for the rational restriction of such a procedure. 
The methodological ‘anything goes’42 position that is defended on these grounds 
therefore differs from a methodological pluralism that cannot be theoretically 
justified.43 
 
In contrast to the methodological level, the method level is concerned with the 
techniques that allow us to present intersubjectively verifiable results. As we have seen, 
positivistic fallibilism requires a combination of deductive and inductive methods. And 
since a wide range of techniques are to be found among the inductive methods of the 
quantitative and qualitative social sciences in particular, we can speak here of method 
pluralism as a norm in modern economics, and of method plurality as representing the 
current state of the discipline. The choice and combination of methods used in any 
given case has to depend on the relevant research question and must ensure 
argumentative rigour while also testing the fallibility of the ‘conjectural knowledge’ 
acquired. A method monism that made use of only one technique could not be 
theoretically justified. ‘Method monism,’ however, might be conceived more narrowly 
as the exclusive acceptance of a specific form of deduction, such as formal-
mathematical reductionism, which is an essential feature of the neoclassical mainstream 
(cf. Dutt 2014: 482, Lawson 2013), and which prompted Frank Hahn (1992) to advise 
his colleagues “to avoid discussions of ‘mathematical economics’ like a plague.” In this 
case, we would be dealing with a highly controversial44 yet successful standardisation 
                                                 
42
 The expression ‘radical pluralism’ (in contrast to ‘structured pluralism’; cf. Dow 2004) is 
sometimes used instead of ‘anything goes.’ Since we shall reserve the term ‘methodological 
pluralism’ to describe the acceptance of a number of competing discrimination processes, 
however, we shall not speak of ‘pluralism,’ but rather of ‘anything goes’ or ‘nihilism’ where it 
is a question of the rejection of such processes.  
43
 If methodological pluralism is nonetheless advocated here (e.g. Dow 1997, Dow 2004, Dusek 
2008 Samuels 1997), this is either due to a failure to clearly distinguish between 
methodological, ontological, and method pluralism, or to the characterisation of an ‘anything 
goes’ position in terms of ‘radical pluralism’—a characterisation that I would reject for the 
reasons given above.   
44
 What is controversial here is not formalisation in general, but rather the notion that it is a 
necessary condition of scientific validity. This notion is not only criticised by mathematics-
averse economists, but also by economists with a very strong mathematical orientation, such 
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of the notion of science, one that equates argumentative rigour and neutrality with 
mathematisation and brands any other form of argument as inferior (cf. Lucke 2006, 
Schmidt/aus dem Moore 2010). The rejection of narrative techniques within deductive 
approaches, along with alternative methods such as abduction (cf. Mabsoud 2015), 
cannot be plausibly justified in this manner, and at best this rejection amounts to an 
unfortunate ‘method-absolutism’ (cf. Funke 2009: 82). To defend such an absolutism on 
the grounds that the use of non-formal procedures would constitute a “regression to an 
obsolete status quo ante” (Schmidt/aus dem Moore 2010: 174; own translation, my 
emphasis), is to fail to see that method pluralism precisely does not allow for the one-
sided privileging of certain methods.  
 
Epistemological pluralism also needs to be distinguished from theoretical pluralism. 
At the epistemological level, what is at issue is whether competing explanatory systems 
have to be accepted (pluralism) or rejected (monism). At the theory level, however, 
what is in question is whether our social reality can be explained by means of an all-
encompassing model (monism) or whether a number of approaches (pluralism) are 
required in order to capture all of the facets of our object of investigation. Now it is a 
central feature of a mature science that it differentiates this object and develops a range 
of custom-fit theories, each of which is rooted in a pregiven epistemology, paradigm, or 
research programme. Examples include adding dynamic elements to basic static models 
or devoting independent theories (that are nonetheless compatible with basic 
epistemological models) to individual objects of investigation (e.g. cross-border trade 
relations in the field of ‘international economics’ or deeper considerations of the labour 
market beyond quantitative employment regulations in macro models within the field of 
‘labour economics,’ etc.). Since such a multiplicity of theories would lack the 
opposition that, on our reading at least, is inherent to the concept of ‘pluralism,’45 we 
would do better to speak of ‘theory multiplicity’ or ‘theory differentiation,’ rather than 
‘theory pluralism’ here. However that may be, it can hardly be seriously disputed that 
an object of enquiry as complicated as that of economic interaction calls for a variety of 
theoretical approaches—regardless of whether one subscribes to ontological, 
epistemological, or methodological monism, pluralism, or scepticism/relativism. On the 
other hand, ontological and epistemological pluralism necessarily requires a ‘true’ 
theoretical pluralism, rather than a mere multitude of theoretical approaches.      
 
What remains to be discussed is only the paradigmatic level, which has been touched 
on above a number of times. Though the term ‘paradigm’ is derived from Kuhn’s theory 
of scientific revolutions, the paradigmatic level can best be described in terms of the 
different dimensions of Lakatos’ ‘scientific research programmes’ (cf. Lakatos 1974). 
Alongside the epistemological and method-related dimensions already discussed, there 
is also a heuristic dimension, which is a defining feature of the paradigmatic level (cf. 
Homann 1988: 88ff., Heise/Thieme 2015: 250). Here it is a question of postulates, 
‘model predictions’ (Graf 1978), or ‘ideal types’ (cf. Kapeller 2012: 124ff.) that anyone 
who subscribes to a given paradigm would have to share (‘positive heuristics’) or at 
least not call into question (‘negative heuristics’). The paradigmatic level thus brings 
together the epistemological level and the method level and, in addition, introduces a 
further level which makes it possible to introduce a distinction between a true 
                                                                                                                                               
as Robert Solow (2005). 
45
 As Helmut Spinner (1974: 238) writes: “Theory pluralism is given if and only if there is a 
plurality of theories that stand in a mutually critical relation to one another.” 
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‘paradigmatic pluralism’ and simple ‘paradigm variation.’46 Paradigm variation allows 
for alternative axiomatic explanatory systems at the epistemological level and/or 
alternative deductive or inductive approaches at the method level, all of which share the 
same heuristic, whereas paradigmatic pluralism involves the adoption of different 
heuristics, which must be based on an epistemological difference, but not necessarily on 
method pluralism. If, on the one hand, method monism cannot be theoretically justified, 
and, on the other, method pluralism does not constitute a necessary condition of 
paradigmatic pluralism, then the heuristic and epistemic dimensions are sufficient to 
allow us to make consistent statements concerning paradigm variation and paradigmatic 
pluralism (cf. Table 2). 
 
Table 2: Paradigmatic monism, paradigm variation, and paradigmatic pluralism 
 
  
 
Epistemological Level 
 
  
 
Pluralism 
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Paradigm variation 
 
 
Paradigmatic monism 
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u
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Paradigmatic pluralism 
 
 
- 
 
While paradigmatic monism necessarily entails the extremely restrictive assumption of 
an epistemological and heuristic monism, the acceptance of competing explanatory 
systems at the epistemological level does not necessarily entail paradigmatic pluralism 
if a uniform (positive or at least negative) heuristic is adopted. Such a form of paradigm 
variation has to be distinguished from true paradigmatic pluralism, which only arises 
when axiomatic variation is accompanied by heuristic openness.47 
 
The following tables show the internal connections between the various forms of 
monism and pluralism we have discussed. It is evident here that paradigmatic monism 
entails ontological monism, but also that it is compatible with method and theoretical 
pluralism. Epistemological pluralism is also conceivable within a paradigmatic monism, 
and this combination is characteristic of the positions that are sometimes described as 
                                                 
46
 This distinction is sometimes captured in terms of ‘intraparadigmatic pluralism’ versus 
‘interparadigmatic pluralism.’ In light of the above qualification concerning the concept of 
pluralism, however, I shall speak of paradigm variation rather than intraparadigmatic 
pluralism.  
47
 The majority of economists—even those who regard themselves as critics of the orthodoxy—
do not seem to acknowledge this distinction. Rodrik’s (2015) new book, in any case, which 
according to Margaret Levi (on the back cover of the book), “clarifies the considerable power 
of economics and its substantial limits,” has nothing to say on the legitimate coexistence of 
incompatible or incommensurable paradigms, and applies the concept of pluralism only to 
theories, methods (here pluralism is defended) and methodologies (here pluralism is rejected).  
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the ‘Colander edge’ or as those of ‘dissenters’ within a paradigm,48 and which we 
referred to above in terms of (mere) ‘paradigm variation.’  
 
Table 3: Forms of Scientific Monism 
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Paradigmatic 
Monism 
 Yes no yes no no 
Ontological 
Monism 
yes  no yes no no 
Epistemological 
Monism 
yes Yes  Yes no no 
Methodological 
Monism 
no No no  no no 
Method  
Monism* 
- - - -  - 
Theoretical 
Monism 
yes Yes yes Yes no  
Notes: * not theoretically justifiable; ** theoretical monism also includes theory variation/differentiation 
among object-specific but compatible theories (see above). The table is to be read across the rows: 
monism x corresponds to/presupposes/is compatible with monism y.  
 
Table 4: Forms of Scientific Pluralism 
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Paradigmatic Pluralism 
 yes yes no  yes yes 
Ontological Pluralism Yes  yes no yes yes 
Epistemological 
Pluralism 
No yes  no yes yes 
Methodological  
Pluralism* 
- - -  - - 
Method 
Pluralism 
No no no no  no 
Theoretical 
Pluralism 
No no no no no  
Notes: * not theoretically justifiable; ** methodological pluralism explicitly does not include a 
methodological ‘anything goes’ (see above). The table is to be read across the rows: pluralism x 
corresponds to/presupposes/is compatible with pluralism y.  
 
                                                 
48
 These terms were introduced into the literature by Dobusch/Kapeller (2012: 1036-7.); 
Colander/Holt/Rosser (2004) themselves speak of the ‘cutting edge’ or the ‘edge of 
economics.’ What is meant here is that scientific progress often takes place through the 
transformation of certain core assumptions at the epistemological level, while a given 
(negative) heuristic is maintained, so that novelty is produced through paradigm variation. 
Behavioural economics offers one example of such variation, since it limits the assumption of 
the rationality of actors without calling into question the market clearing heuristic. In the wake 
of the recent global financial crisis, such behavioural approaches are often used to model 
financial markets. This is regarded as the ‘cutting edge’ of economics (cf. eg. McDonald 
2009), as is illustrated by the awarding of the Nobel Prize to the behavioural economist Robert 
Shiller for his work on financial markets—particularly in collaboration with the traditional 
economists Eugene Fama and Lars Hansen. 
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The theoretical assumptions of paradigmatic monism contained within ontological 
monism—i.e. the endorsement of the ‘one world, one truth’ hypothesis and the claim 
that social reality is a closed system—are nevertheless so rigid and unjustifiable that 
ontological pluralism becomes irrefutable as a theoretical norm. This gives rise to a 
domino effect, which runs from epistemological pluralism, through method and 
theoretical pluralism, and up to paradigmatic pluralism as the only adequate model 
of economic enquiry—any restriction of this pluralism would have to be rejected as a 
violation of scientificity and academic freedom. Nevertheless, a thoroughgoing notion 
of pluralism derived in this way does not by itself justify methodological pluralism or 
even an ‘anything goes’ position. These depend on the kind of repudiation of the ‘one 
world, one truth’ hypothesis advocated by the sceptic and the relativist. In other words: 
one does not have to be a rigid sceptic or relativist to accept thoroughgoing scientific 
pluralism as a model of economic enquiry. On the other hand, one must accept 
inadmissibly restrictive premises in order to reject such scientific pluralism as a model 
of enquiry.  
 
4. On the (Dire) State of Contemporary Economics 
 
The criticism of economics introduced at the beginning of this paper tends to lament the 
fact that the current state of the discipline is less plural than a thoroughgoing scientific 
pluralism would require. At the same time, however, the description of the discipline in 
these terms is also regarded as a cognitive misjudgement and the establishment of a 
monistic paradigm is celebrated as an indication of a mature (i.e. highly developed, 
high-performing) ‘normal science.’ How might we assess these apparently conflicting 
appraisals on the basis of the above analysis? Here it is necessary to introduce a 
conceptual opposition that paradigmatically underpins the notion of pluralism, namely 
that between heterodoxy and orthodoxy. Orthodoxy refers to the paradigm that uses the 
dominant heuristic in a discipline. Heterodoxy, by contrast, refers to all of the 
paradigms that reject this heuristic. The relative dominance49 of a given heuristic is of 
course time and context dependent, and can therefore change over the course of time. In 
the sociology and history of science, many studies have now appeared on the formation 
of dominant paradigms.50 For our purposes, however, what is particularly important is 
the relation between heterodoxy and orthodoxy: paradigmatic pluralism requires the 
mutual acceptance of and conflict between propositions and methods,51 along with 
access to all of the forms of capital (economic, social, symbolic, and cultural) that allow 
                                                 
49
 ‘Dominance’ here means no more than that a relative majority of scientists feel obliged to use 
the orthodox epistemology, methods, and heuristics. The term ‘orthodoxy’ often seems to 
imply not just a quantitative majority, but also the disparagement of other approaches as 
heretical. Even if this may seem to be the case—particularly in the eyes of heterodox 
scientists—orthodoxy refers here only to the truth claim that is also shared by pluralists.  
50
 Cf. e.g. Heise/Sander/Thiele (2016), Heise (2014), Hesse (2010), Fourcade (2009), Maeße 
(2013), Maeße/Pahl/Sparsam (2016). 
51
 In this regard, Dobusch/Kapeller (2012: 1043ff.) distinguish between ‘selfish,’ ‘disinterested,’ 
and ‘interested’ pluralism, where ‘selfish pluralism’ sees this mutual acceptance only as a 
means of ensuring its own continued existence, ‘disinterested pluralism’ goes no further than 
mutual tolerance, and ‘interested pluralism’ strives toward the ecumenical ideal of a common 
pluralistic paradigm. How a ‘pluralistic paradigm’ can reconcile incompatible and 
incommensurable theories and heuristics seems to me wholly unclear; perhaps what the 
authors have in mind here is an ‘eclectic paradigm,’ which refers to the practice of drawing on 
various different paradigms depending on the object of investigation.   
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a position to be established in the scientific field. What is crucial here is that a ‘true’ 
paradigm pluralism be established, and not merely a form of paradigm variation that, in 
combining epistemological pluralism with heuristic monism (cf. Table 2), only serves to 
expand the orthodoxy and transform it into the ‘mainstream.’ A paradigmatic monism, 
by contrast, would be characterised by the elevation of the orthodoxy to the status of a 
‘normal science,’ which at best might still tolerate other mainstream paradigms and thus 
allow for paradigm variation. Heterodox paradigms, however, would be dismissed as 
non-scientific or at least as not properly belonging to the discipline, and would therefore 
be excluded from access to resources.  
 
It is rather uncontroversial to say that neoclassical economics52 constitutes the dominant 
contemporary orthodoxy within the economic discipline.53 Since its application in 
treating economic questions does not need to be explicitly justified, since the 
neoclassical model of resource allocation determines the uncontested canon in textbooks 
on economics,54 and since the vast majority of research articles (if they have any 
theoretical basis at all) employ theories and models rooted in neoclassical economics, 
the latter can be considered to enjoy the monistic status of a ‘normal science.’ This is all 
the more true insofar as the heterodoxy is largely ignored by the orthodoxy (cf. 
Colander 2010: 45; Kapeller 2010b; Lee 2011: 575), is excluded from the largest 
economics journals (King 2002b: 133ff.), and is largely blocked from significant 
(academic) positions (‘symbolic capital’) and funding sources (cf. Heise/Sander/Thieme 
2016, Lee 2004, Mata 2009, Maeße 2013). Finally, the fact that certain crucial 
‘dissenters’ within the mainstream have pledged their allegiance to the dominant 
heuristic paradigm has served to cement the monistic position of the orthodoxy.55 
 
In light of the above theoretical discussion, we would then have to speak of the dire 
current state of economics insofar as it is bound to a paradigm monism. Here it does not 
help to point to the theoretical and method variety (sometimes unreflectively presented 
as a method pluralism) within the economic discipline, since, as Table 3 shows, such 
forms of pluralism can easily be reconciled with an unjustifiable paradigmatic monism. 
This now allows us to gain a better understanding of the position advocated by the 
representative of the Verein für Socialpolitik that we noted at the outset. On the one 
hand, this position seeks to justify the repression of heterodox approaches on the 
                                                 
52
 Under the heading, ‘neoclassical economics,’ we include both dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium modelling (DSGE) and Neo-Keynesianism; on this and the classification of other 
theories with respect to the orthodoxy-heterodoxy opposition cf. Heise/Thieme (2015a); 
Heise/Thieme (2015b) and Appendix A. Cf. also Lawson (2013); Arnsperger/Varoufakis 
(2006), Blaug (1980: 137ff.). 
53
 Studies by Colander/Klamer (1987), Klamer (2007), Frey/Humbert/Schneider (2007) and 
Heise/Sander/Thieme (2016) not only indicate this contemporary dominance, but also show 
that it has increased in the last three decades, both in Germany and in the USA (the world’s 
scientific hegemon).  
54
 In sharp contrast to textbooks on sociology, in which various schools of thought or paradigms 
are quite naturally presented alongside one another without prejudicing a ‘mainstream.’ 
55
 These include: in behavioural economics, Vernon Smith (2003: 505); in evolutionary 
economics, Carsten Hermann-Pillath (2002: 21); and in complexity economics, the leading 
figures at the Santa Fe institute, Kenneth Arrow (1988: 275ff.) and Blume/Durlauf (2001). 
The heuristic that characterises the contemporary mainstream is the market clearing logic 
manifested in Walras’ law as a model solution, which as little excludes disequilibria as 
temporary phenomena as disequilibrium dynamics as its investigative focus and 
methodological basis. 
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grounds that they have lost the battle of ideas.56 On the other, it celebrates a theoretical 
and method pluralism (Bachmann 2015a; 2015b, Erlei 2015). Since paradigmatic 
monism is compatible with a plurality of methods and theories, nothing logically 
prevents such a combination—particularly when ‘plurality’ in fact means variation or 
differentiation. If we also allow that method pluralism (i.e. the acknowledgement that 
inductive and deductive methods must always be combined within fallibilistic 
positivism) may be compatible with method absolutism (i.e. conceiving formal-
mathematical deduction as the implicit standard of scientificity) then we can gain a 
clearer understanding of a frequently voiced intra-paradigmatic criticism. It is 
particularly the ‘Ordnungsökonomen’ and the members of the ‘Austrian school’57—
whose members reject formal-deductive analysis as being based on a ‘pretence of 
knowledge’ (cf. Hayek 1975: 441)—who have called for greater acceptance of non-
formal approaches or even for a method pluralism that would also allow narrative 
approaches to be considered scientifically defensible: “In my view, one can agree with 
the pluralists that there is currently very little acceptance of non-mathematical 
approaches and that there is probably a selective distortion which disadvantages non-
formal theories. Mathematics undoubtedly allows certain thoughts to be formulated 
more clearly and unambiguously; yet there is no good reason why one should not be 
able to gain new and important insights in other ways too” (Erlei 2015; own 
translation). Though this criticism is certainly justified, and though the means of 
discriminating against such ‘dissenters’ (the ‘selective distortion’) may be very similar 
to those encountered by heterodox economists, it should be noted that the basis for the 
discrimination is quite different in each case: the ordoliberal dissenters constitute the 
‘collateral damage’ produced by a standardisation process that emphasises 
professionalisation, but not by a lack of method or theoretical pluralism. The heterodox 
economists, on the other hand, see themselves as being excluded from a field governed 
by a paradigmatic monism, on account of their rejection of the ‘mainstream heuristic.’    
 
Finally, our analysis also sheds further light on the meaning of the ‘Colander edge’: 
David Colander (2000) is one of the most prominent advocates of the view that the 
‘normal science’ of neoclassical economics has long since given way to a theoretical 
pluralism, and thus feels justified in speaking of the ‘death of neoclassical economics.’ 
On this view, the call for pluralism which suggests that monism represents the current 
state of the discipline (on account of the narrow-mindedness of its adherents) would 
then have to be rejected both in substance and on strategic grounds.58 As Tables 3 and 4 
show, however, theoretical pluralism and epistemological pluralism by no means entail 
paradigmatic pluralism. When Colander, in a later work co-written with Richard Holt 
and Barkley Rosser Jr., speaks of the ‘changing face of mainstream economics,’ it is 
                                                 
56
 It might be noted here that such arguments never feel the burden of having to verify such 
claims by means of logical or empirical falsification; in a circular manner, they rather take the 
quantitatively weak position of such heterodoxies within the scientific field as sufficient proof 
of their failure. 
57
 Ordnungsökonomik and the ‘Austrian school’ differ from neoclassical economics in respect of 
their methods, but not in terms of their epistemology and heuristics (cf. Heise 2009b: 385ff. 
Heise/Thieme 2015a: 254). For this reason it would be inappropriate to classify them as 
‘heterodox’ (as do e.g. Schubert 2015, Dobusch/Kapeller 2012: 1037); they are rather 
‘dissenters’ within the mainstream. 
58
 “Seeing the mainstream’s rejection of their ideas as due to the mainstream’s closed-
mindedness may make heterodox economists feel better, but it is not a way to open up 
dialogue between mainstream and heterodoxy” (Colander 2010: 36). 
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clear that what he has in mind is indeed an epistemological pluralism (cf. Table 2), 
which provides a basis for paradigm variation (i.e. theories at the ‘Colander edge’ 
which contain a number of axiomatic or method-specific innovations) within the 
mainstream,59 but not necessarily for a paradigmatic pluralism that would spell the 
‘dissolution of the mainstream’ or an ‘opening up of the mainstream.’  
 
 
5. Conclusion: The Necessity for a Pluralisation of Economics 
 
The essence of the foregoing reflections is simple: the only appropriate model of 
enquiry in the economic discipline is a thoroughgoing scientific pluralism that 
culminates in an ontological and paradigmatic pluralism. This should not be 
misconceived as an ethically motivated norm of fairness or tolerance, but is rather a 
scientific imperative. Furthermore, a more extensive methodological pluralism or 
‘anything goes’ position, which denies the ontology of the ‘one world one truth’ 
principle in the manner of the sceptic or the relativist, is not to be categorically 
excluded, but is also not a logical consequence of ontological and paradigm pluralism 
(cf. Figure 1). 
 
If one regards the historical ‘Methodenstreits’ essentially as a conflict over the unifying 
conception of a scientific discipline, one will also see in the call for methodological 
pluralism a historical rupture between economics and economic sociology, which has its 
own disciplinary and academic orientation (cf. Maurer 2011). It is therefore not 
inappropriate to consider the pluralisation of the economic discipline in terms of the 
relation between the orthodoxy, the mainstream, and the heterodoxy.  
 
Figure 1: Pluralism and Paradigms 
 
 
Here we can see (cf. Figure 1) that the economic discipline is characterised by an 
ontological and paradigmatic monism in which neoclassical economics constitutes the 
‘normal science.’ Though the latter allows for method and theoretical pluralism, and 
comes to form a ‘mainstream’ (i.e. facilitates epistemological pluralism and paradigm 
variation) through the inclusion of ‘dissenting’ schools of thought or paradigms, 
including information economics, complexity economics, and behavioural and 
evolutionary economics, it nevertheless excludes heterodox paradigms such as Post-
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 This would appear to be what Rodrik (2015: 63ff.) has also described as the ‘horizontal 
progress’ of economics—i.e. a form of paradigmatic expansion or variation that rejects the 
‘vertical progress’ constituted by the replacement of one paradigm by another.  
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Keynesianism, Neo-Ricardianism, or Marxism60 on the basis of heuristic differences. 
The interpretative pre-eminence of the mainstream is so great that even mainstream 
paradigms that do not adopt a formal-mathematical, deductive approach (such as the 
Ordnungsökonomik tradition and the ‘Austrian school’) are discriminated against. This 
not only results in the loss of economics’ legitimacy, but also of its academic freedom 
and capacity for critical reflection—the very resources that determine the progressive 
character of a discipline. 
 
A healthy form of economics would not then be marked by an adherence to a ‘normal 
scientific’ paradigmatic monism, but rather by a state of competition between a wide 
range of heuristics, all of which would potentially be subject to empirical falsification. 
Within the sphere of economics so conceived, it would be taken as given that advocates 
of the various different paradigms should mutually acknowledge, communicate with, 
and criticise one another, and, as a necessary precondition of such engagement, would 
allow one another access to those resources which make it possible to maintain a 
position within the scientific field.61  
 
Pluralism entails neither relativism nor nihilism, nor the application of an eclectic 
approach or the elaboration of ‘pluralistic paradigms’; it merely entails the absence of 
discrimination against ontologies, paradigms, and methods that are subject to scientific 
critique and an acceptance of the limitations of the economic discipline (and the social 
sciences in general): namely that there is no certain, universally accepted knowledge 
(‘truth’), but rather only ‘conjectural knowledge’ that could be falsified at any time.  
 
In light of the criticism of the discipline discussed at the outset, we can surely doubt that 
such a modest form of economics would lose social and scientific legitimacy (on this cf. 
Leuschner 2012). And yet a vague hope of legitimacy of course cannot provide a sure 
theoretical foundation for an academic discipline. Finally, on such a scenario, 
economics would no longer be able to elevate itself above other social-scientific 
disciplines in which a wide-ranging pluralism is taken for granted (cf. in regard to 
sociology e.g. Greshoff/Lindemann/Schimank 2007). 
 
In a number of prior studies (cf. Heise 2014, Heise/Sander/Thieme 2016, Yalcintas 
2016), doubts have been raised as to whether economics can achieve the necessary 
pluralisation from within its own scientific community.62 Put in the language and logic 
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 For an explanation of this classification and a discussion of the potential ambiguities of these 
paradigms, cf. Heise/Thieme (2016). 
61
 This characterisation of an acceptable—i.e. plural—form of scientific exchange by no means 
excludes the possibility that the scientist as an individual should be committed to only one 
paradigm and should regard this as being superior to all other paradigms. This seeming 
paradox can be resolved if we draw a distinction between ‘pluralism at the individual level’ 
and ‘pluralism at the collective level’ (cf. De Langhe 2010b).   
62
 The reasons for this include: the overly unequal endowment of the mainstream and the 
heterodoxy with economic, social, cultural, and symbolic capital; the resultant strength of the 
mainstream within the scientific field; path dependence; and the prevalent formal and informal 
incentive structures. The mainstream is also able to bolster its position by placing itself at the 
head of, and seeking to guide, a reform movement under the motto ‘rethinking economics.’ At 
the international level, this role has been taken on by the ‘Institute for New Economic 
Thinking’ founded by the financial speculator George Soros (cf. Häring 2014). In Germany, 
the ‘Stifterverband’ (an association supported by German industry) has used its ‘rethinking 
economics’ [Ökonomie neu denken] initiative not exactly to support the overcoming of 
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of the discipline itself, it would seem that the ‘market for economic ideas’ has 
experienced a market failure, which can only be rectified via external intervention. 
This is not the place, however, to elaborate the precise form that such a ‘regulated 
pluralism’ would have to take, nor the mode of its implementation—this task will need 
to be left to further studies.  
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monism, but rather to anxiously question whether, within new forms of economic thinking, 
“the pendulum is swinging directly from an excessive belief in the market to an uncritical 
acceptance of state intervention? Is the acceptance and legitimacy of social market economics 
in danger?” (Stifterverband 2016). 
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Appendix A: Classification of Economic Paradigms 
Axiomatic Methodology Heuristic Paradigm Theoretical School 
- Rationality 
hypothesis 
- Ergodicity 
hypothesis 
- Substitutionality 
hypothesis 
 
Formal-mathematical, 
deductive, positivistic 
reductionism + highly 
developed 
empiricism/experimenta
lism 
Acceptance of the 
stability of market 
clearing as a 
‘model solution’ 
 
DSGM - New classical 
macroeconomics 
- Neo-Keynesianism 
- Standard Keynesianism 
 
Questioning a 
number of core 
hypotheses 
 
 
Formal-mathematical, 
deductive, positivistic 
reductionism + highly 
developed 
empiricism/experimenta
lism 
 
Acceptance of the 
stability of market 
clearing as a 
‘model solution’ 
 
DSGM 
dissenters 
- Behavioural economics 
-Neuroeconomics 
- Complexity economics 
(partially) 
- Evolutionary economics 
(partially) 
 
- Rationality 
hypothesis 
- Ergodicity 
hypothesis 
- Substitutionality 
hypothesis 
 
Rejection of formal-
mathematical, 
deductive, positivistic 
reductionism. 
 
Acceptance of the 
stability of market 
clearing as a 
‘model solution’ 
 
DSGM 
dissenters 
- Ordnungsökonomie 
- The Austrian School 
 
- Rationality 
hypothesis 
- Ergodicity 
hypothesis 
- Substitutionality 
hypothesis  
- Asymmetrical 
information 
distribution 
hypothesis 
 
Formal-mathematical, 
deductive reductionism 
+ highly developed 
empiricism/experimenta
lism 
 
Rejection of the 
stability of market 
clearing as a 
‘model solution’ 
 
Dissenters/He
terodoxy 
- Information economics 
Questioning a 
number of core 
hypotheses 
Acceptance of formal-
mathematical deduction 
+ narrative analysis 
 
Rejection of the 
stability of market 
clearing as a 
‘model solution’ 
 
 
Heterodoxy - Post-Keynesianism 
-
Socioeconomics/socioeconomi
c institutionalism 
- Regulation theory/Marxism 
-Complexity economics 
(partially) 
- Evolutionary economics 
(partially) 
 
- Rationality 
hypothesis 
- Ergodicity 
hypothesis 
- Substitutionality 
hypothesis 
 
Formal-mathematical, 
deductive reductionaism 
+ highly developed 
empiricism/experimenta
lism 
 
Rejection of the 
stability of market 
clearing as a 
‘model solution’ 
Heterodoxy - Neo-Ricardianism 
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